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Wahaha's major shareholder, I can't bear it

2025-07-21

Wahaha's major shareholder, I can't bear it

Jinjiao Finance

·July 18, 2025 16:30

Why did Hangzhou's state-owned assets hastily sell off in less than a year after Zong Fuli succeeded to the throne, despite decades of peaceful coexistence during the reign of Zong Qinghou? A further question is: why do we now have to intervene in the inheritance and grievances of the Zong family after unsuccessful attempts to get rid of them?

The dispute over Zong Qinghou's inheritance continues to ferment, but the plot quietly reaches a turning point.


On July 17th, the Finance Bureau of Shangcheng District, Hangzhou City responded to the media that a special team has been established to intervene and handle disputes related to the inheritance of Zong Qinghou. This means that the silent major shareholder of Wahaha, the state-owned enterprise holding 46% of the shares, has finally taken a crucial step away from watching coldly.


Just three days ago, Wahaha insisted that "family affairs have nothing to do with company operations" and refused to provide any response.


The nature of this family feud is undergoing a transformation from being a power game within the family to a storm core involving public interests and corporate governance, from "the company is irrelevant" to the involvement of a special team in state-owned assets.


Major shareholder changes face

Many people do not know that Wahaha, which has been controlled by the Zong family for many years, is actually a mixed ownership enterprise of state-owned assets and family.


According to Qichacha data, the largest shareholder of Hangzhou Wahaha Group Co., Ltd. is Hangzhou Shangcheng District Wenlvshang Investment Holding Group Co., Ltd., which is affiliated with the Shangcheng District Finance Bureau. This means that 46% of Wahaha Group's shares are real state-owned assets.


But for decades, this major shareholder who holds nearly half of the shares has been almost invisible.


Zong Qinghou leads the management and strategy of Wahaha, forming a complete closed-loop system of strongman culture and family governance. State owned enterprises do not intervene in operations or participate in management, acting more like an "invisible investor" who claims to "support the development of private enterprises" externally, while internally letting Zong Qinghou "make decisions alone".


This "strongman led+state-owned assets backed" structure operated well in the era of Zong Qinghou. But when Zong Qinghou passed away, there was a vacuum in the focus of governance, and there was fierce competition for heirs. The complexity and risks of the problem were truly revealed, and the major shareholders of state-owned assets could no longer remain silent.


In July 2024, a resignation letter from Zong Fuli was circulated online, which mentioned that "the People's Government of Shangcheng District, Hangzhou City and some shareholders of Wahaha Group have questioned the rationality of Wahaha Group's operation and management since the death of Zong Qinghou, the chairman. Zong Fuli has decided to resign from her positions as vice chairman and general manager of Wahaha Group and no longer participate in its operation and management.


This caused a huge uproar, coupled with the prevailing public opinion at the time, forming a wave similar to "Princess Chang is isolated and helpless". The major shareholder of state-owned assets responded hastily, saying that "they were not aware of Zong Fuli's resignation, but the leadership is verifying it".


If this response only breaks the previous silence, then the upcoming trademark transfer event is even more worth pondering.


In February 2025, Hangzhou Wahaha Group issued a statement on the transfer of "Wahaha" series trademarks, stating that a total of 387 "Wahaha" series trademarks are being applied for by the China National Intellectual Property Administration to be transferred from Hangzhou Wahaha Group Co., Ltd. to Hangzhou Wahaha Food Co., Ltd., in other words, from the state-owned major shareholders to the company controlled most by Zong Fuli.


However, this matter changed in May. According to a report by Phoenix Network's "Storm Eye", Shangcheng District Culture and Tourism Group has been in continuous negotiations with Zong Fuli regarding the Wahaha trademark matter. They intend to transfer their 46% stake in "Hangzhou Wahaha Group Co., Ltd." to Zong Fuli, but the price has not been agreed upon.


This is interesting, upgrading from "transferring 387 trademarks" to "transferring 46% equity", the major shareholder of Wahaha has taken such a big step and is about to transform Wahaha from a state-owned enterprise to a private enterprise.


Why did Hangzhou's state-owned assets hastily sell off in less than a year after Zong Fuli succeeded to the throne, despite decades of peaceful coexistence during the reign of Zong Qinghou?


A further question is: why do we now have to intervene in the inheritance and grievances of the Zong family after unsuccessful attempts to get rid of them?


No longer endure

Wahaha's major shareholder has always had their own difficulties.


From Wahaha's revenue perspective, it can be considered a very high-quality asset. For example, in the past three years, sales have consistently exceeded 50 billion yuan, with an estimated return to 70 billion yuan in 2024, a year-on-year surge of approximately 20 billion yuan.


In theory, Hangzhou Shangcheng District State owned Assets, which holds 46% of the shares, should receive considerable dividends every year, but the fact is quite surprising.


According to an article published by the Economic Reference News, a subsidiary of Xinhua News Agency, titled "Suspected Damage to the Rights and Interests of State owned Shareholders and Employees, Wahaha's' External 'Puzzle to be Solved", as of the end of 2022, the total assets of the domestic' Wahaha Group '(including external companies) were 37.047 billion yuan, and the net profit was 4.767 billion yuan; However, the total assets of Wahaha Group, which is jointly owned by state-owned enterprises, are only 5.807 billion yuan, with a net profit of only 18.7128 million yuan.


That is to say, the scale of this external company is much larger than that of Wahaha Group, where state-owned assets are located. The former's profit is 254 times that of the latter, so it can be inferred that the dividends that state-owned major shareholders can receive are quite limited.


It should be pointed out that over 100 Wahaha external companies are not related to state-owned assets, but they conduct commercial activities around Wahaha products, with the controlling power behind them pointing to Zongjia.




|There are countless enterprises under Zong Fuli's name that are independent of Hangzhou Wahaha Group.


The report further stated that from 2008 to the end of 2022, Wahaha Group did not sign any preferential policies with the government of Shangcheng District. Wahaha Group did not distribute profits on its books, but issued formal shareholder resolutions every year. The dividends of the management and employee stock ownership association were taken in the name of "fund transactions", while state-owned shareholders did not distribute dividends.


According to several employees of the shareholding association, after the restructuring, the management and employees who have invested in Wahaha will receive an annual dividend of no less than 0.8 yuan per share. If this ratio is applied, the largest shareholder, Shangcheng Wenlv (holding 242 million shares), should receive an annual dividend of about 200 million yuan.


So, on the other hand, since the major shareholders of state-owned assets have not received fair dividend rights for many years, why can they live peacefully in the era of Zong Qinghou, but no longer tolerate it after Zong Fuli succeeded to the throne?


Some senior lawyers in the industry believe that this is because corporate taxation has gradually replaced national (public) stock dividends as the main source of government revenue. For local governments, the taxes and fees paid by enterprises within their jurisdiction are the key factors that have a greater impact on the increase of local finances. In this situation, the attention of local governments to whether state-owned shareholders can receive sufficient dividends in Wahaha Group is relatively reduced, and local governments are even the weaker party when facing investment pressure from other local governments on local star enterprises.


In other words, as long as the enterprise develops steadily locally, contributes to taxation and creates employment, it is the greatest contribution to the local government. In the era of Zong Qinghou, enterprises were stable and governance was dominated by strong people. Local governments chose to "tacitly approve" and even tolerate the existence of increasingly large "external companies" controlled by families.


One sentence: If the founder manages well, let him do as much as possible; In the event of a storm, I also hope that the 'family affairs can be resolved', so as not to cause greater turmoil.


So now that the state-owned assets have stepped forward, it indicates that the turmoil that has emerged is not just a "family matter", but may affect the stable development of Wahaha, and further affect local taxation and employment. According to a report by Southern Metropolis Daily, a Wahaha distributor stated that the Wahaha family dispute has had an impact on product sales and market confidence. "As a distributor, can I continue this year


In terms of product sales, third-party data platforms show that after the Wahaha family dispute incident was exposed, the e-commerce platform Wahaha's sales declined on July 14th and 15th, with daily sales falling from the range of 10000 to 12000 to the range of 5000 to 7500. The number of related live broadcasts decreased from 317 on July 12th to 91 on July 15th, and the number of live influencers dropped from over 200 before to 75 on July 15th.


Chinese food industry analyst Zhu Danpeng believes that this public opinion crisis has had a significant impact on the future of Wahaha, including its sales and overall development.


Moreover, Wahaha itself has become a symbol of national brands, and state-owned enterprises cannot afford the consequences of national brands crashing into their hands.


Why did the specialized class come here

The shift in attitude of major state-owned shareholders from 'unsuccessful exit' to 'intervention' is driven by a more realistic consideration: Wahaha's equity structure has become too complex, to the point where they can no longer stand idly by.


This may also be the reason why state-owned assets in Shangcheng District, Hangzhou once attempted to divest and clear their positions. Wahaha has too many factories and companies with complex equity structures. If a third-party company takes over, it will require a great deal of effort to sort them out. A former employee of Wahaha mentioned in an interview that it's not that the problem will be covered up with the delivery of the transaction after the equity is sold, but rather that these 46% of the shares are 'sick'.


Wahaha's equity structure can be traced back to the 1990s. Wahaha Group, formerly known as Hangzhou Baoling Children's Nutritional Food Factory, was renamed Hangzhou Wahaha Food Group Co., Ltd. after merging with a canning factory in 1991. It is 100% owned by the State owned Assets Supervision and Administration Bureau of Shangcheng District, Hangzhou. In 1999, Wahaha underwent a restructuring, with several equity transfers resulting in the ownership of 46% by the State owned Assets Supervision and Administration Bureau of Shangcheng District, 29.4% by Zong Qinghou (later inherited by Zong Fuli), and 24.6% by nearly 2000 formal employees.




But in 2018, while still at the helm, Zong Qinghou pushed for a stock "repurchase" plan, converting employee shareholding into dry shares, in other words, the shares were recovered but the dividends remained. However, in recent years, as the company's dividends have decreased, some employees have stopped buying into this' repurchased 'agreement. Starting from 2024, some senior employees will form a rights protection committee in an attempt to overturn the agreement and restore their shares through legal means.


This is just one of the triggers.


What really worsened the situation was the inheritance dispute that surfaced after the death of Zong Qinghou. The "second tier" of the Zong family, led by the three children born to "Shadow Lady" Du Jianying, has initiated multiple lawsuits in Hong Kong and Hangzhou. In addition to demanding the liquidation of trust funds, they are also attempting to divide the 29.4% company shares inherited by Zong Fuli. According to Article 1127 of the Civil Code, children born out of wedlock have equal inheritance rights as children born in wedlock. If their claims are partially or fully supported by the court, Zong Fuli's shares are likely to face splitting.


This means that Wahaha's already complex equity structure will become even more chaotic. For any enterprise, an out of control equity structure is a major taboo in governance; For state-owned assets that prioritize stability, this is an unacceptable situation.


According to industry insiders, in this context, it cannot be ruled out that the major shareholders of state-owned assets will strengthen their own discourse power and even promote the reshaping of governance structure. It is reported that 5% of the shares in the employee shareholding association were originally transferred from the Shangcheng District government. If the government has the ability to recover this portion of shares, plus the existing 46%, state-owned assets can achieve absolute control over Wahaha Group.


Of course, all of this still cannot avoid a reality: the massive 'outside system Wahaha' still exists. During her lifetime, Zong Qinghou had laid out a series of assets outside the system. Now, Zong Fuli has forcefully eliminated dissidents and incorporated Wahaha's core assets into the "Hongsheng series". As a result, she is willing to shut down 18 factories, triggering the "OEM gate" incident. The fierce competition has had a severe impact on Wahaha's brand reputation and stable development.


From this perspective, the establishment of a "special team intervention" by the major shareholder of state-owned assets to handle family disputes may not be solely for the purpose of "coordinating family affairs". It may also be that state-owned assets are preparing for deeper goals: leveraging the current situation, clarifying equity, restructuring governance, and reconfirming their strategic role as state-owned controlling shareholders.


Next, the key is to see three actions: whether the specialized team will publicly express their stance, whether they will intervene in equity coordination, and whether they will promote governance restructuring.


Regardless of the outcome, the Wahaha, created by Zong Qinghou with a strong sense of patriotism and personal will, has become a thing of the past.


This article is from the WeChat official account "Jinjiao Finance". The author is Jiao Ye, 36 Krypton.


The viewpoint of this article only represents the author himself, and the 36Kr platform only provides information storage space services.




娃哈哈大股东,不忍了

金角财经·2025年07月18日 16:30
在宗庆后时代几十年里相安无事,为何在宗馥莉继位不到短短不到一年的时间,杭州国资就着急脱手呢?更进一步的疑问是:在脱手未成功后,为何如今又要下场介入宗家的遗产恩怨呢?

宗庆后遗产之争仍在持续发酵,剧情却悄然迎来拐点。

7月17日,杭州市上城区财政局回应媒体称,已就宗庆后遗产相关纷争“成立专班,介入处理”。这意味着,一直沉默的娃哈哈大股东——持股46%的国资方,终于不再冷眼旁观,迈出了关键一步。

而就在三天前,娃哈哈方面还在坚称“家族事务与公司运营无关”,拒绝提供任何回应口径。

从“公司事不关己”到国资下场“专班介入”,这场宗家纷争的性质正在发生转变,不再只是家族内部的权力博弈,而是正一步步演化为牵涉公共利益、企业治理的风暴核心。

大股东变脸

很多人并不知道,宗家掌控多年的娃哈哈,其实是一家国资与家族混合持股的企业。

根据企查查资料,杭州娃哈哈集团有限公司的第一大股东是杭州市上城区文商旅投资控股集团有限公司,该公司隶属于上城区财政局,也就是说,娃哈哈集团46%的股份为实打实的国有资产。

但几十年来,这位持股近半的大股东几乎“隐身”。

宗庆后主导着娃哈哈的经营与战略,强人文化与家族治理形成了完整的闭环体系。国资方则不插手经营、不参与管理,更像一位“隐形投资人”,对外声称是“支持民营企业发展”,对内则放手让宗庆后“一人定乾坤”。

这种“强人主导+国资托底”的结构,在宗庆后时代运转良好。但当宗庆后去世,治理重心出现真空,继承人争夺激烈,问题的复杂性和风险才真正显现,国资大股东难再保持沉默。

2024年7月,网传一封宗馥莉辞职信,其中提及“杭州市上城区人民政府及娃哈哈集团部分股东就本人(宗馥莉)自宗庆后董事长离世后,对娃哈哈集团经营管理的合理性提出质疑,宗馥莉决定自即日起辞去娃哈哈集团副董事长、总经理职务,不再参与其经营管理”。

由此引发轩然大波,加之当时的舆论风向,形成了类似“长公主孤立无援”的声浪,对此国资大股东罕见仓促回应称“对宗馥莉辞职并不知情,惟领导正在核实中”。

如果说这次回应只是打破以往沉默的态度,那么接下来的商标转让事件则更值得玩味。

2025年2月,杭州娃哈哈集团发布关于“娃哈哈”系列商标转让的声明称,“娃哈哈”系列商标共计387件正在国家知识产权局申请由杭州娃哈哈集团有限公司转让至杭州娃哈哈食品有限公司,换言之,就是从国资大股东手上转给宗馥莉控股最多的公司。

然而,此事到了5月发生了变化。凤凰网《风暴眼》报道称,就娃哈哈商标事宜,上城区文商旅集团与宗馥莉持续谈判,有意将持有的46%“杭州娃哈哈集团有限公司”股份转让至宗馥莉,但价格未谈拢。

这就有意思了,从“转让387件商标”升级为“转让46%的股权”,娃哈哈大股东这步子也跨得太大了,一下子就要把娃哈哈从国资变成民企。

在宗庆后时代几十年里相安无事,为何在宗馥莉继位不到短短不到一年的时间,杭州国资就着急脱手呢?

更进一步的疑问是:在脱手未成功后,为何如今又要下场介入宗家的遗产恩怨呢?

不再隐忍

娃哈哈大股东,其实一直都有自己的苦衷。

从娃哈哈的营收来看,算得上是非常优质的资产。以最近3年为例,销售额均超过500亿,其中2024年业绩规模预估回到了700亿,同比暴增了约200亿元。

照理来说,手握46%股权的杭州上城区国资,每年分红应该是相当可观,但事实却让人大跌眼镜。

根据新华社旗下《经济参考报》发布的《国有股东和职工权益涉嫌受损,娃哈哈“体外”迷局待解》一文称,截至2022年底,境内“娃哈哈系”(包括体外公司)总资产为370.47亿元,净利润为47.67亿元;而国资参股的娃哈哈集团资产总额仅为58.07亿元,净利润只有1871.28万元。

也就是说,这个体外公司的规模要比国资所在的娃哈哈集团大得多,前者利润是后者的254倍,由此可以推算,国资大股东能获得分红相当有限。

需要指出的是,超过100家的娃哈哈体外公司与国资无关,但它们围绕娃哈哈产品开展商业活动,背后控制权指向宗家。

| 宗馥莉名下独立于杭州娃哈哈集团的企业多如牛毛。

该报道还进一步表示,2008年至2022年末,娃哈哈集团未与上城区政府签订优惠政策,娃哈哈集团账面不进行利润分配,但每年出具形式上的股东会决议,管理层和职工持股会的分红以“资金往来”名义拿走,国有股东则不分红。

而据多位持股会员工介绍,在改制后,娃哈哈管理层和入股的职工每年分红都不低于每股0.8元,如果按照此比例,身为第一大股东的上城文商旅(持有2.42亿股)每年分红应当为约2亿元。

那么话说回来,既然国资大股东多年来一直未获得公平的分红权益,为什么在宗庆后时代可以相安无事,而在宗馥莉继位后却不再隐忍?

有业内资深律师认为,这是因为企业税收已经逐渐取代国家股(全民股)分红,成为政府的主要收入来源。对于地方政府而言,辖区内企业缴纳的税费才是对地方财政增量有更大影响的重头戏。在这种情况下,地方政府对于国有股东在娃哈哈集团中是否能获得足额分红的关注度相对降低,而地方政府在面对其他地方政府对本土明星企业的招商引资压力时甚至是弱势的一方。

换言之,只要企业在本地稳定发展,贡献纳税、创造就业,就是对地方政府最大的贡献。在宗庆后时代,企业稳健、治理强人主导,地方政府选择“默许”,甚至可以容忍存在家族控制越来越庞大的“体外公司”。

一句话:创始人管得好,就让他尽量放手去干;出现风波,也希望“家事家解决”,别引来更大的动荡。

那么现在国资站出来,说明出现的风波已经开始不只是“家事”了,有可能会影响到娃哈哈的稳定发展,进而波及地方的税收、就业。根据南方都市报报道,一名娃哈哈经销商表示称娃哈哈家族纠纷事件对于产品销售及市场信心都有影响,“作为经销商,我今年还干得下去吗?”

从产品销量上,第三方数据平台显示,娃哈哈家族纠纷事件曝出后,7月14日、15日,电商平台娃哈哈销量下滑,日销量从1万-1.2万区间下滑至5000-7500区间,关联直播数从7月12日的317跌至7月15日的91,直播达人从此前的超200人跌至7月15日的75人。

中国食品产业分析师朱丹蓬认为,这一次的舆论危机对于整个娃哈哈的未来产生了较大的影响,其中对于娃哈哈未来的销量以及整体的发展也带来了危机。

更可况,娃哈哈本身已经成为了民族品牌的象征,国资也无法承受民族品牌坠毁在自己手上的后果。

专班为何而来

从“脱手未果”到“下场介入”,国资大股东态度的转变,背后有一个更现实的考量:娃哈哈的股权结构,已经变得太复杂了,复杂到他们再也无法袖手旁观。

这或许也是杭州上城区国资曾试图脱脱手清仓的原因所在。“娃哈哈有太多股权结构复杂的工厂、公司”,如果有第三方公司接手,理清要耗费极大的心力。一位娃哈哈老员工在接受采访时就提到,不是说股权卖掉以后,问题就随着交易的交割而被掩盖,这46%的股份,是“带着病的”。

娃哈哈的股权结构可以追溯到上世纪90年代。娃哈哈集团,前身是杭州保灵儿童营养食品厂,1991年兼并罐头厂后更名为杭州娃哈哈食品集团有限公司,由杭州市上城区国资局100%持股。1999年,娃哈哈改制,在几番股权转让下,娃哈哈集团变成由上城区国资局持股46%,宗庆后持股29.4%(后由宗馥莉继承),近2000名正式职工持股24.6%。

但在2018年,宗庆后仍在掌舵时推动了一项股权“回购”方案,将员工持股转为干股,换句话说,股份收回了,但分红还在。然而近几年,随着公司分红减少,部分员工对这份“被回购”的协议不再买账。2024年开始,部分老员工组建维权委员会,试图通过法律手段推翻当年协议,恢复股份。

这还只是其中一根导火索。

真正让局面雪上加霜的,是宗庆后去世后浮出水面的遗产之争。以“影子夫人”杜建英所生三子女为首的宗家“第二梯队”,已经在香港和杭州发起多起诉讼,除要求清算信托资金外,还试图分割宗馥莉所继承的29.4%公司股份。根据《民法典》第1127条,非婚生子女与婚生子女享有同等继承权,若诉求被法院部分或全部支持,宗馥莉手中的股份很可能将面临拆分。

这意味着娃哈哈原本就复杂的股权结构,将变得更加混乱。对任何一家企业而言,失控的股权结构都是治理的大忌;对以稳定为最高优先级的国资来说,更是一种不能接受的局面。

有业内人士判断,在这种背景下,不排除国资大股东会强化自身话语权,甚至推动治理结构重塑。有消息显示,员工持股会中的5%股份,原本就是上城区政府转让而来。倘若政府有能力将这部分股份回收,再加上现有的46%,国资就能实现对娃哈哈集团的绝对控股。

当然,这一切仍无法回避一个现实:庞大的“体系外娃哈哈”依然存在。宗庆后生前曾布局一系列体系外资产,如今宗馥莉强势清除异己,将娃哈哈核心资产装入“宏胜系”,为此不惜关停18家工厂,引发“代工门”事件,激烈争斗对娃哈哈的品牌声誉和稳定发展造成剧烈冲击。

以此观之,国资大股东此次成立“专班介入”处理宗家纠纷,未必只是为了“协调家事”。也可能是国资在为更深层次的目标做准备:借助当前局势,厘清股权,重整治理,重新确认自身作为国有控股股东的战略角色。

接下来,关键要看三个动作:专班是否会公开表态、是否介入股权协调、是否推动治理结构重整。

无论结果如何,那个由宗庆后一手缔造的家国情怀浓烈、个人意志高度主导的娃哈哈,已然成为过去式。

本文来自微信公众号“金角财经”,作者:角爷,36氪经授权发布。

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